Syria and the Great Power Struggle on the Ruins of War

Washington sees the fall of the Assad regime as a golden opportunity to achieve what it has failed to do for decades: to extricate Syria from the Russian-Iranian axis. The visit of U.S. President Donald Trump to Saudi Arabia and his meeting with al-Shara, along with the lifting of Western sanctions on Damascus, were not just passing diplomatic steps, but part of a broader strategy to connect Syria with the West and turn it into a strategic ally. However, the new Syrian government, despite its openness to the West, realizes that complete dependence on America means losing any bargaining chip with Moscow or Beijing. Additionally, the Syrian street, which has suffered for decades under totalitarian rule, will not easily accept the transformation of its country into a military or political base for any foreign power.
As for Russia, it still holds important cards, the most prominent being the military base in Tartus, which is considered the gateway to its influence in the Mediterranean. The visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shabani to Moscow confirms that Damascus does not want to completely sever ties with the Kremlin.
However, the biggest challenge for Russia is convincing the new Syrian leadership that it can offer more than what the West provides. In light of Western sanctions on Moscow due to the Ukraine war and its declining economy, it is difficult for Russia to compete with American or Gulf investments in reconstruction.
While the American-Russian competition intensifies, China is coming in through the back door, carrying a bag full of investments. The "Belt and Road Initiative" gives Beijing a winning card in Syria, especially since Damascus is in dire need of hundreds of billions for reconstruction. China has always been keen to present itself as a non-political economic partner, making it a relatively acceptable option for the Syrian government.
However, China faces another challenge: how to invest in Syria without provoking Washington? The intense global U.S.-China competition may prevent Syria from becoming a major hub for Beijing's projects. Additionally, the declining Iranian influence in Syria may open the door for China to fill the void, but this will not be easy amid American vigilance.
The new Syrian government, on one hand, needs Western support to save its collapsing economy, and on the other hand, cannot do without the Russians and Chinese, who may be slower in giving but are less demanding than the West when it comes to sovereignty.
The most likely scenario is that Damascus will try to play all sides by adopting a policy of "practical non-alignment," meaning openness to everyone without being beholden to anyone. But this option is fraught with risks, as great powers do not offer anything for free.
In the end, Syria stands at a crossroads: either it succeeds in leveraging this international competition to rebuild a stable state, or it turns into another battleground for proxy wars, where Syrians pay the price once again. The choice between these two paths will not be determined in Moscow, Washington, or Beijing, but in Damascus itself.